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Liberal Peace Implementation and the Durability of Post-war Peace 
 
Abstract 
This article examines the correlation between the implementation of liberal peace provisions in 
peace accords and the duration of peace by drawing on data from the Peace Accords Matrix that 
comprises 34 comprehensive peace agreements signed in the post-Cold War period. Our key 
findings confirm that the duration of peace is improved when the liberal aspects of peace 
included in peace accords are implemented. In addition, the article examines peace duration in 
relation to UN peacekeeper deployment and mechanisms for peace accord verification – in an 
attempt to establish factors that enhance the duration of peace. Peacekeeping is found to have a 
positive impact, while verification mechanisms do not. The findings highlight the need to unpack 
and scrutinize more thoroughly the complex roles of liberal peacemaking. 
 











This article examines some of the key, and heavily debated, issues in contemporary International 
Relations. It is particularly interested in the duration of peace and thus connects with a series of 
cognate debates on the meaning(s) of peace and how peace might be measured. Questions that arise 
from this research agenda touch on the duration versus the quality of peace, and issues of how this 
is to be captured. The past two decades have seen very considerable academic, policy and public 
debate on the (dis)advantages of the liberal peace, or the dominant form of peace support 
intervention favoured by leading states in the international system and its allied international 
institutions.  From its apparently neo-imperialistic nature to its ill-managed exit strategies, a wide 
range of pitfalls have been discussed from both normative and empirical perspectives. More recent 
studies have challenged these critiques by questioning the validity of their empirical evidence, and 
the very existence of the liberal peace. This article seeks to contribute to the discourse on 
contemporary peacemaking by examining the extent to which the liberal peace can impact on the 
duration of peace. The introduction of empirical evidence into debates on the utility of the liberal 
peace is, we believe, a useful and original contribution. 
Specifically, our study examines the correlation between (1) the implementation of the contents of 
peace accords that we identify as being core parts of the liberal peace with (2) the duration of peace 
in post-war societies. Peace duration is measured in terms of whether or not the signatories to a 
peace accord returned to armed conflict. Our study is based on an analysis of 34 comprehensive 
peace accords (CPAs) signed in the post-Cold War period and draws on data from the Peace 
Accords Matrix (PAM), a detailed database of post-1989 comprehensive peace accords. PAM 
includes data and analysis on peace accord content and implementation. Other data sources, notably 
the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) and the Polity 2 database of political stability, are used 
3 
to augment the PAM data. Through this analysis, we are able to empirically confirm that there is a 
positive correlation between the implementation of the liberal peace provisions of a peace accord 
and the duration of peace.  
The article proceeds by outlining our understanding of the liberal peace and, in particular, how 
we identify the liberal aspects of contemporary peace accords and how the implementation of 
those liberal aspects can lead to a more durable peace, at least on the part of signatories. It then 
introduces the research design before going on to present and analyze the findings on the extent 
to which a peace that may be identified as ‘liberal’ influences the duration of that peace. 
Moreover, the roles played by field deployment (UN peacekeeping and verification mechanisms) 
in maintaining peace will be discussed in relation to the implementation of liberal peace 
provisions. This is followed by a note on the robustness tests of the empirical findings, and a 
concluding discussion. The chief finding of the article is that the implementation of the liberal 
aspects of a peace accord has a positive correlation with the duration of peace.  
The authors are aware that the concept of peace is notoriously contested. Moreover, they 
recognize that merely reaching an accord and having an accord that lasts cannot automatically be 
accepted as ‘peace’. The concept of ‘political unsettlement’ (Bell and Pospisil 2017) neatly 
captures post-peace accord situations in which there is a peace accord, but the parties merely 
grudgingly accept to co-exist with the other rather than engage in meaningful reconciliation. 
Gauging peace on the basis of whether or not peace accord signatories return to violence does not 
take account of spoiler violence from those who were not signatories of the peace accord, nor 
does it take into account post-peace accord criminal violence. Such violence, as attested by high 
crime rate societies like El Salvador and South Africa, often dominates life in these contexts. 
Nevertheless, since peace accords are the most visible, and often internationally recognized, 
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statements of peacemaking, it is legitimate for this study to use them and their contents in its 
examination of peace duration.  
 
The Liberal Peace and its Critiques 
The liberal peace is taken to mean the dominant form of peace-making and peacebuilding that is 
supported by leading states, international organizations and international financial institutions 
(Paris, 2004; Richmond, 2006; Richmond and Franks, 2011). It justifies itself using liberal rhetoric 
and is associated with practices and institutions that are regarded as liberal such as democracy, free 
markets, transparency, accountability, individual rights and the rule of law. The extent to which 
the liberal peace is actually liberal, and whether it sometimes relies on illiberal methods, has been 
the subject of much debate. The academic literature has examined the philosophical heritage of 
liberal internationalism (Kant, 1795; Gray, 2000; Richardson, 2001), the link between a state’s 
liberal disposition and its pacific orientation in international affairs (Small and Singer, 1976; Doyle, 
1983; Brown, 2002; Ray, 2005), and the normative value of liberal institutions (Fukuyama, 1992; 
Owen, 1994; Mayall, 1996). 
For the purposes of this article, we are interested in liberal peacebuilding in the sense of post-Cold 
War comprehensive peace accords and consequent peacebuilding. Importantly, while the liberal 
peace can be conceptualized as a series of peace accords in quite different conflict contexts, it is 
prudent to regard it systemically. It is a system of peace-building, -keeping, enforcement and 
maintenance that has a sustained, if not always coherent, ideological heritage and is linked to 
material power in the sense of particular states and institutions and the incentives and coercion that 
they can offer. So while this article analyses peace accords, it can also be read as an empirically-
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informed commentary on the dominant internationally-endorsed contemporary system of 
international peace intervention and support.  
The dominance of the liberal peace in contemporary peacemaking and post-war reconstruction has 
been subject to extensive academic discussions over the last two decades. These discussions have 
measured rhetoric against practice and pointed to apparent illiberal and dysfunctional aspects of 
peacemaking. They have highlighted that the liberal peace primarily reflects third-party interveners’ 
perspectives and frequently fails to reflect the political, social and cultural contexts in the war-
affected countries. Critical studies contend that many contemporary peacebuilding programmes 
demonstrate significant limitations in bringing about consolidated post-war peace (Paris, 2004; 
Richmond, 2005; Futamura, Newman and Tadjbakhsh, 2010; Mac Ginty, 2011), with some studies 
focusing on practical challenges and others on the normative and Euro-centric associations of the 
liberal peace (Lyons, 2004; Obi, 2007; Franks and Richmond, 2008; Bellamy and Williams, 2010; 
Sisk and Reynolds, 1998; Chopra, 2000; Pugh, Cooper and Turner, 2008; Chandler, 2009; Harris, 
2012; Shinoda, 2015). The literature has also expanded to include alternative or supplementary 
mechanisms such as local ownership, hybrid peace, everyday peace, and the like (Mac Ginty 2011). 
In more recent debates, the validity of the previous critiques has begun to be questioned. These 
‘critiques of critiques’ have included defences of the liberal peace, by arguing that alternative 
models may be unpalatable or less reliable (Paris 2010; Quinn and Cox 2009). Some argue that an 
assumption of the liberal dominance in contemporary peace interventions is itself an exaggeration 
or a ‘myth’ that misunderstands the realist nature of the international politics (Selby 2013; Zaum 
2012). Theoretical works have also called into question the ability of critics to make valid criticisms 
as they themselves are implicated in the very liberal peace that they seek to criticize.  
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However, a lack of systematic and comprehensive examination of the achievements and 
limitations of liberal peacebuilding remains a significant knowledge gap in the conventional 
peacebuilding discourse. Many contemporary discussions on the liberal peace are either 
normative discussions or a qualitative examination of a selected number of case studies. While 
normative discussions frequently present a distinctly ideological flavour, the case studies based 
on field research usually rely on a small number of cases and thus often lack a systematic 
examination of the overall trends. There are a substantial number of quantitative studies that 
evaluate the roles of some liberal elements of peace accords such as democratic institutions 
(Doyle and Sambanis 2002, 2006; Hartzell and Hoddie 2007; Joshi and Mason 2011; Joshi 2013; 
Walter 2002), the demobilization of military groups (Wagner 1993; Licklider 1995; Walter 1997; 
Joshi and Melander 2017), the reconstruction of the (market) economy (Paris, 2004; Doyle and 
Sambanis 2000, 2006) and the protection of civilians (Huttman et al. 2013). Nevertheless, these 
studies tend not to connect directly with debates on the liberal peace, and a comprehensive 
evaluation of a wider range of peace accord provisions that might be said to constitute the liberal 
peace is rarely conducted. Hence,  we feel justified in offering systematic empirical evidence that 
can guide judgments on the existence, quality, nature and duration of the liberal peace. 
This article aims to help address this knowledge gap by examining the correlation between the 
liberal peace and peace duration. In addition, it will provide a finer grained analysis of how the 
liberal peace operates alongside two often-deployed elements of peace support: verification 
mechanisms and UN peacekeeping. 
Previous studies using PAM data have been useful in revealing the character of contemporary 
peacemaking. A study by Joshi, Lee and Mac Ginty (2014) demonstrated the extent to which 
contemporary peace accords can be considered ‘liberal’ through an analysis of peace accord 
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provisions. This contradicts arguments by Selby (2013) that denied the existence of the liberal 
peace. The findings showed that it is accurate to label contemporary internationally-sponsored 
peace accords as ‘liberal’ on the basis of the contents of peace accord provisions and their 
promotion of five factors: democracy, human rights, the rule of law, Security Sector Reform (SSR) 
and governance reform. Taken together, these five factors constitute the liberal peace as manifest 
in contemporary peace accords. If an accord prominently promotes these factors then it can be 
called a liberal peace accord.    
Most peace accords address issues of participation and place an emphasis on institutionalizing post-
conflict elections and electoral reform. These post-conflict elections are often designed with an 
emphasis on the inclusion of former armed actors and marginalized segments of the population. 
The aim is to recalibrate the polity so as to allow for the representation of previously excluded 
constituencies, and thus lessen the possibility of grievances sparking renewed conflict. Rule of law 
provisions in peace accords may also be said to be a quintessentially liberal intervention that offer 
protection and certainty to citizens, property and the polity. This may involve (re)constructing 
constitutional frameworks, or new governance measures to enhance judicial independence. 
Relatedly, peace accords often place an emphasis on rights. This may be retrospective in the sense 
of addressing wartime human rights violations, and other transitional justice measures such as 
amnesty, reparations and truth commission mechanisms. It may also involve provisions for the 
post-conflict dispensation such as protections for minorities and cultural expression. 
There may also be significant reforms in the security sector with an emphasis on civilian oversight 
of security agencies. Liberal peace provisions have also placed significant emphasis on governance 
reforms – often mediated through statebuilding interventions that attempt to right-size, regularize 
and make the state more efficient and transparent. Thus, through liberal peace provisions, and in 
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an ideal scenario, individual rights are protected and promoted, institutions are reformed, and 
systems of accountability are put in place. Depending on context, peace agreements may protect 
and support indigenous and minority rights as well as children’s and women’s rights, and secure 
their social, economic and political representation. The philosophy behind such initiatives is that 
societies with transparent and accountable systems in place to regulate competition over scarce 
resources, and to regulate relationships between different identity groups, are less likely to 
experience violent conflict. In a nutshell, the liberal peace is based on the notion that liberalism 
institutionalized and operationalized in a domestic political setting is likely to result in peace at 
home and abroad.  
 
Research Design: Data, Dependent and Independent variables 
This study measures the extent to which the liberal peace correlates with peace duration. 
Specifically, it examines whether the duration of peace is correlated with the extent of liberal 
peace implementation. In order to proceed, we need to identify how we operationalize the liberal 
peace in this study. To identify the core attributes of the liberal peace we analyzed eight major 
policy documents from international organizations.1 Taken together, the documents can be 
regarded as the seminal corpus of contemporary international peacebuilding.  The five recurring 
                                                 
1The documents examined in this article are: UN Secretary General (UNSG) (1992). An Agenda for Peace: 
Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peace-Keeping, UN doc., A/47/277–S/24111; The Panel of United Nations 
Peace Operations (2000). Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations (Brahimi Report), UN doc., 
A/55/305–S/2000/809; UN (2004). A More Secured World: Our Shared Responsibility – Report of the High-Level 
Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, UN doc., A/59/565; International Commission on Intervention and State 
Sovereignty (2001) The Responsibility to Protect, Ottawa: International Development Research Centre; UNSG 
(2005). In Larger Freedom: Towards Development, Security and Human Rights for All, UN doc., A/59/2005; UNSG 
(2009). Report of the Secretary-General on Peacebuilding in the Immediate Aftermath of Conflict, UN doc., 
A/63/881–S/2009/304; International Dialogue on Peacebuilding and Statebuilding (2011). A New Deal for 
Engagement in Fragile States. Declaration issued at the 4thHigh Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness, Busan, South 
Korea, 30 Nov. 2011; and UNDP (2012). Governance for Peace: Securing the Social Contract, New York: UNDP. 
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ideas of the liberal peace outlined in the previous section (the promotion of democracy, rule of 
law, human rights, security sector reform and governance reform) are often manifest in peace 
accords. We categorise peace accord provisions around these five clusters and take them to be 
key signifiers of the liberal peace. These issue areas often form the basis of statebuilding, 
‘stabilization’, and reconstruction programmes that follow a peace accord. Peacebuilding 
programmes and projects often include many other issues, such as nurturing of civil society, 
promoting social inclusion and facilitating a market economy, although sometimes these go 
beyond the scope of the peace agreements and take place in later stages of conflict settlements.  
Earlier work on the Peace Accords Matrix identified 51 issue areas with which peace accords 
dealt (Joshi and Darby, 2013). We were then able to match 23 issue areas with the five liberal 
peace policy categories we identified from the major peacebuilding documents (see Table 1). The 
primary goal of this study is to examine the impact of all liberal peace provisions in an integrated 
way, which will address the knowledge gap in the existing liberal peace discourse.  
Table 1 About Here. 
 
In the next stage of our research design, we matched the implementation of liberal peace 
elements in CPAs. This study utilises the implementation rate of all liberal peace provisions 
included in a peace accord as the primary indicator for measuring the independent variable. 
Specifically, in examining the implementation of liberal peace provisions, this study refers to the 
Peace Accords Matrix Implementation Data (PAM-ID), which provides annual implementation 
data for 51 provisions for 10 years after a CPA was signed (Joshi, Quinn and Regan 2015). For 
example, the Dayton or General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina 
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was reached in 1995 and the PAM-ID provides annual implementation data until 2005. The 
implementation data for these provisions are available until 2012 or when a major armed conflict 
that produced over 1,000 deaths recurred and the peace accord became obsolete.  
Based on the concept of viability – a practical goal for coding full implementation of individual 
provisions given the current level of implementation – Joshi, Quinn and Regan code 
implementation of individual provisions in CPA as initiated or not initiated, and if initiated, then 
whether the status is minimum (coded 1), intermediate (coded 2), or full (coded 3) for the year 
under observation. If a major reversal takes place in the implementation of particular provisions, 
such as in Sierra Leone where the agreed-upon amnesty was revoked for the alleged involvement 
of Foday Sankoh and others in renewed violence, the implementation status is adjusted 
accordingly (Joshi, Quinn and Regan, 2015).  
Based on this implementation information, a variable Liberal Peace Implementation is generated 
that calculates the annual implementation rate by summing the actual implementation value for 
all liberal peace related provisions. The sum is then divided by the expected value of 
implementing these provisions. The outcome is then multiplied by 100. For example, there are 22 
liberal peace provisions in Sudan’s 2005 CPA. The expected value for fully implementing all 
these provisions is 66 as the full implementation for each provision takes a value of 3. For all 22 
provisions, the overall implementation value for the first year of accord is 33 and therefore the 
Liberal Peace Implementation rate is (33/66)*100 = 50 per cent. This rate improved to 56 per 
cent in 2006. 
The implementation rate captures the extent to which the liberal provisions negotiated in CPAs 
are implemented and therefore does not provide any information on the scope of the liberal peace 
reforms as negotiated in the accord. While liberal peace reforms outside the CPA remain a 
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theoretical possibility, the implementation rate variable needs to be contextualized with the scope 
of liberal peace reforms negotiated in the accord. For example, when focusing entirely on the 
implementation rate, a peace process with three liberal peace provisions (all of which present a  
high implementation rate) is considered more liberal than a process with 20 provisions (which 
present with moderate implementation). At the same time, a focus only on the number of liberal 
peace reforms cannot be a sufficient indicator to identify the liberal nature of a peace process. 
The number of liberal peace provisions required in a peace process vary according to the contexts 
of conflicts, social conditions and the types of challenges facing peace processes. For instance, 
provisions on ‘indigenous rights’ or ‘transitional government’ are relevant to some conflict 
affected societies but not to others. Hence, to have a more liberal peace provisions does not 
necessarily bring about a stronger representation of liberal peace.  
 
In our model, this factor is reflected by adjusting the implementation rate according to the 
number of liberal peace provisions using both lenient and strict implementation scores. 
Moreover, we include the quantity of liberal peace provisions in our empirical analysis along 
with other provisions (see the ‘Robustness and Endogeneity Tests’ section). According to PAM-
ID, an agreement on average entails 12 provisions related to what we identify as liberal peace 
signifiers. Guinea-Bissau’s Abuja Peace Agreement (1998) contained the least with only 3 
provisions that could be associated with the liberal peace. Sudan’s 2005 Comprehensive Peace 
Agreement had the most with 22 provisions. 
As specified in the hypotheses, the dependent variable is the recurrence of armed conflict 
between the signatories who negotiated the CPA. Based on the Uppsala Conflict Data Program 
armed conflict dataset, this variable is coded “1” when armed conflict between signatories 
reoccurred, otherwise it is coded “0” (Themnér and Wallensteen, 2013). For the first year of 
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observation, or the CPA signing year which could still see some violence prior to the signing of 
the CPA we do not code armed conflict. In the data used in this analysis, signatories returned to 
either minor or major conflicts in 10 cases (29.41 per cent) within a decade of signing of an 
accord.  
Table 2 presents descriptive statistics for all variables used in the analyses. In our empirical 
analysis, we control for various factors that are related to armed conflict, factors that are likely to 
influence the content of the peace accord. Moreover, we control for battle deaths by using the 
data from UCDP (2014) because conflict intensity and duration are found to influence 
powersharing provisions and are important factors considered for international intervention, 
especially when the United Nations must decide whether to send peacekeeping forces (Hartzell 
and Hoddie, 2007; Gilligan, 2003). As an alternative, we also examine total deaths incurred in 
specific conflicts by utilizing the PAM data (Joshi and Darby, 2013). The PAM data is also used 
to control for war duration. The deployment of peacekeeping forces reduces commitment 
problems and thus the recurrence of conflict by providing a guarantee of security and reducing 
uncertainty when peace agreements provide for parties to verify the military (Walter, 1997; 
Doyle and Sambanis, 2000, 2006; Joshi, 2013; Mattes and Savun, 2010). Therefore, in our 
analysis, we control for the deployment of UN peacekeepers. Using the PAM-ID, this variable is 
coded “1” when the peacekeeping forces are deployed and “0” if they are not deployed.  
Many peace accords provide a verification mechanism to monitor implementation progress and 
this often involves international monitors, parties to the peace process, and representatives from 
civil society. This provision is significantly related to the overall implementation of peace 
agreements (Joshi, Lee, and Mac Ginty 2017). We thus control for the implementation of 
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verification provisions by using the PAM-ID data. This variable is coded “1” when verification 
mechanisms are implemented and “0” if otherwise. 
Table 2 About Here. 
Following previous studies on state capacity and peace agreement implementation (DeRouen et 
al., 2010), we use infant mortality rates and the total number of armed personnel to examine the 
influence of state capacity in peace implementation. Similarly, we control for annualized GDP 
growth rate. Data for these variables come from the World Bank’s World Development 
Indicators (World Bank 2013). Because the analysis of policy documents related to the liberal 
peace suggests that the promotion of democracy is the most integral part of liberal peace (Joshi, 
Lee, and Mac Ginty, 2014), and emerging democracies are more susceptible to armed conflict, 
we control for democracy using the executive constraints (XCONST) indicator from the Polity 
IV data (Marshall, Gurr and Jaggers, 2013). Constraints on the executive as defined in the Polity 
IV project refer to oversight on the decision-making power of chief executives. In democracies, 
the oversight function is often carried out by the legislature or the independent judiciary. We 
derive a dummy variable coded “1” when the XCONST is high (levels 5-7) and “0” when 
otherwise. This reflects the high levels of constraints that are often seen with democratic regime 
types. 
Additionally, the media can be perceived to be responsible for fomenting violence and/or 
encouraging peace processes (Mitchell, 2012; Wolfsfeld, 2004). We use data from Joshi and 
Quinn (2017) to control for media coverage. Data on media coverage is likely to be over-
dispersed from case to case because some peace implementation processes receive more media 
coverage than others. To deal with the data dispersion issue, we take the natural log of this 
variable. 
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A final point on research design is a reminder that the PAM data refers to comprehensive peace 
accords. Thus partial, minor and un-signed accords lie outside of its remit. Comprehensive 
accords usually seek a definitive end to violent conflict and cover a wide range of issues beyond 
security and constitutional issues. They will also seek to include a wider range of conflict actors.  
 
Empirical Analysis and Findings 
In analyzing the data, our first question was: “To what extent were peace accord provisions 
related with the liberal peace implemented?” By this we mean provisions of a peace accord that 
have a demonstrably liberal heritage, as identified by our interrogation of the seminal 
peacebuilding documents and the post-1989 peace accords that identified five signifiers of a 
liberal peace: promotion of democracy, rule of law, human rights, security sector reform and 
governance reform. Figure 1 presents the implementation rates of liberal peace related provisions, 
either 10 years after their initiation or when the data coding was stopped. Although full 
implementation has never happened in cases of post-peace accords since the Cold War, the 
average implementation score of liberal peace related provisions was 70 per cent. This confirms 
that the CPA provisions associated with the liberal peace themes were prioritized during the 
implementation processes. Again it is worth reminding ourselves of the rhetorical and declaratory 
nature of much peacebuilding, and how aspects of the liberal peace may not necessarily result in 
liberal means and outcomes.  
Figure 1 About Here. 
An examination of PAM-ID data also identified different patterns of implementation. Figure 2 
summarizes the overall liberal peace implementation rate for a selection of six peace accords that 
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experienced UN involvement to various degrees and capacities (the transitional authority in 
Cambodia to no role in Bangladesh). As can be seen, all peace accords have their own trajectory 
in terms of how implementation starts and proceeds. This is likely to reflect a complex and 
context-specific story of international, transnational, national and local politics, and economics 
that makes cross-case comparison and generic commentary difficult. Some accords achieved a 
high liberal peace implementation within the first five years of accord (e.g. El Salvador and 
Mozambique), while others made early progress in implementation before plateauing (e.g. Papua 
New Guinea). In Bangladesh, the implementation rate did not improve after an initial surge in the 
first two years. The figures suggest that in many cases there is a gradual implementation process 
that lasted for a decade or longer. In many studies, the success of a liberal peace is evaluated 
within two to five years of a peace accord being reached (Doyle and Sambanis, 2000, 2006). 
These figures, however, demonstrate a gradual implementation of provisions related to liberal 
peace, and that, in many instances, liberal peace provisions were not fully implemented even after 
a decade.   
Figure 2 About Here. 
Our next goal was to investigate if the implementation of the liberal peace provisions in a CPA 
avoids the recurrence of armed conflict between signatories. In other words: does liberal peace 
implementation impact on peace duration? We use the event history or the survival statistical 
method to determine this (Box-Steffensmeier and Jones, 2004; Cleves, Gould and Gutierrez, 
2004). In event history analysis, depending on distribution assumption and tests statistics, various 
parametric modeling options are available. Theoretically, we expect liberal provisions in a CPA 
to be implemented over time and the risk of armed conflict recurrence to decline as the overall 
implementation rate increases. This suggests a typical Weibull or continuous probability 
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distribution pattern. The AIC and BIC test statistics rule out the use of the Cox proportional 
hazard model.2 For all models, but Model 1 and 7, the estimated parameter (p) is higher than 1, 
which suggests that the Weibull model better fits the data.3 Because we are interested in 
analyzing peace duration until an armed conflict recurs between CPA signatories, or time to 
event, we use the Weibull model with the accelerated failure time (AFT) matric (Cleves, Gould 
and Gutierrez, 2004). The use of AFT matric reports coefficient (not the proportional hazard), 
which allows easy interpretation of the coefficient. In the context of survival analysis in this 
study, positive coefficients suggest an increasing rate of peace duration while negative 
coefficients suggest a decreasing rate of peace duration (peace failure). 
Table 3 presents a series of Weibull regression with recurrence of conflict as the failure event. 
We began with the first model that has liberal peace implementation as the only variable in the 
model. Model 2 builds on Model 1 by including battle deaths and war duration (measures of costs 
of conflict), infant mortality rate (a measure of state capacity) and media coverage (a measure for 
domestic and international influence on peace process). Model 3 includes deployment of UN 
peacekeeping and implementation of the verification mechanism. In Model 4, we control for 
executive constraints and conflict type. In Model 5, we add annualized GDP growth rate as a 
control. In Model 6, we substituted battle deaths from all wars to total deaths related to a specific 
conflict leading up to the signing of a CPA. We also used the number of armed personnel along 
with infant mortality as a measure of the state capacity.  
                                                 
2 The Bayesian information criterion (BIC) penalize for additional variables in the model, therefore we rely on 
Akaike information criterion (AIC). Test statistics not reported. 
3 Model 4 and 6 for the lenient implementation rate and 10 and 12 for the strict implementation rate were replicated 
with the Cox proportional hazard method. Results are in the expected direction, but because of test statistics for 
model specifications and theoretical expectations regarding the shape of hazard function, results from the Weibull 
model specification are reported. 
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Table 3 About Here. 
In Model 1, we test direct and unmitigated effects of liberal peace implementation as this 
variable does not include controls for other confounding factors. We find statistically significant 
support for the implementation of liberal peace related provisions (p<0.001, Model 4). This 
finding is replicated across all models (2-5). These consistent findings support the theoretical 
argument that the implementation of liberal peace provisions significantly increases the duration 
of peace or reduces recurrence of armed conflict between signatories. Based on model 4 in Table 
3, we estimated that a one percent increase in liberal peace implementation rate leads to a 9 
percent [100*(1-(exp(-?̂??̂?))) = [100*(1-(EXP(-2.403*0.041)))]  increase in the duration of peace 
between signatories who signed the CPA. In other words, in those post-CPA countries where the 
liberal peace implementation rate was 75 per cent, we see an increase in the chance of durable 
peace by at least two times compared to those post-CPA countries where the implementation rate 
was just 25 per cent. These findings are robust and substantial. 
In Model 2, we find negative and statistically significant support for the infant mortality rate 
impacting on peace durability (P<0.05, Model 4). This suggests that countries with a higher 
infant mortality rate often see a recurrence of armed conflict. This finding is consistent across all 
models. On the contrary, and as expected, we find a positive and significant effect of GDP 
growth rate on the durability of peace (p<0.05). This finding indicates the relationship between 
economic growth and the durability of post-conflict peace. Many countries also tend to adopt a 
liberal market economy in the post-CPA period. Therefore, a portion of economic growth might 
be a function of the adoption of economic reform consistent with the liberal peacebuilding 
framework.4  Similarly, media coverage has a negative and statistically significant relationship 
                                                 
4 We did not test whether the post-CPA GDP growth could be attributed to the post-CPA economic reform.  
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with the recurrence of armed conflict across all models. While we expected media coverage to 
bring international attention and possibly hold the government and former rebel leaders 
responsible for implementing peace agreements, we find instead that media interest foments 
violence even after CPAs are negotiated and put through the implementation process. The most 
logical explanation, however, is that the media coverage increases in instances of failed peace 
processes or in environments where implementation has failed.   
After adding the UN peacekeeping and verification mechanisms variables in Model 3, the battle 
deaths variable becomes positive and significant (p<0.05), which suggests peace durability after 
heavy human death tolls. This remains true in Model 4 as well. The UN peacekeeping variable 
has a positive and significant effect in model 3 and 4 (p<0.10). Although marginally significant, 
this finding aligns with the results of earlier studies of the relationship between UN peacekeeping 
and peacebuilding success (Doyle and Sambanis, 2000, 2006).  
The verification mechanism, which is instituted by the accord itself and often includes 
representatives from the government, the rebel group(s), and international and civil society 
actors, is negative and significant. This finding is surprising because prior studies have 
emphasized how unbiased verification regarding military strength on both sides can resolve 
information uncertainty thus giving them the confidence to persist with the peace process/peace 
deal (Mattes and Savun, 2010). This does not mean, however, that CPAs with a verification 
mechanism in place lack implementation. In fact, Joshi, Lee, and Mac Ginty’s  (2017) analysis of 
the same PAM dataset finds that verification mechanisms have a positive and robust influence in 
the overall implementation of the CPA provisions. In the analysis performed here, there was no 
evidence of significant support of war duration, executive constraints, conflict type, total deaths 
and armed personnel. 
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This finding, instead, reflects the procedural and practical limitations that conventional 
verification mechanisms possess. For instance, many peace processes with strong verification 
mechanisms completed the implementation of peace accord provisions within two years of 
initiation (e.g., Tajikistan, Bougainville, Macedonia, Cambodia, Mozambique, Burundi, Guinea-
Bissau). However, external efforts for speedy implementation, although in line with an agreed 
implementation timetable, may fail to reflect national military factions’ security and political 
concerns. In Cambodia, the Khmer Rouge considered it unexpected and biased that the UN 
Transitional Authority (UNTAC) demanded strict respect for the Paris Peace Accords with little 
pre-consultation (Heder, 1999). Moreover, such a verification mechanism may also create 
obstacles in the implementation process itself. For instance, data provided to or by those charged 
with verification might differ from perceptions on the frontline, perhaps parking security fears 
among parties. Despite UNTAC’s institutional and procedural arrangements for neutral 
verification, the Khmer Rouge thought the subsequent demilitarization procedures paid them 
unfair attention while ignoring their counterparts’ ‘fake disarmament’ (Doyle, Johnstone and Orr, 
1997:118-121). The danger in circumstances like this is that verification mechanisms provide 
evidence not of the implementation of a peace accord, but of the perceived bad faith of the other 
side and so may prompt a resumption of violence. Hence, feeling betrayed by its previous 
advocates, such as China and Thailand, the Khmer Rouge in Cambodia declared that it would 
refuse to collaborate with UNTAC only eight months after it had signed the peace accords 
(Heder, 1999; Lizée, 1999). 
In prior studies, the role of UN peacekeeping operations was often credited with promoting 
liberal peace or peacebuilding success (Stedman, 2003; Doyle and Sambanis, 2006). Our 
analyses, to some extent, help us support this link. For example, we found unmitigated effects of 
liberal peace implementation on peace duration. This is represented in Figure 3. As can be seen in 
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the first part of the Figure (3a), when liberal peace implementation is significantly higher (75 per 
cent or more), recurrence of armed conflict is less likely compared to mid-range (50 per cent), 
lower (25 per cent) or no implementation. This finding suggests that irrespective of UN 
peacekeeping deployment, a higher liberal peace implementation leads to a more durable peace 
between signatories. However, the deployment of UN peacekeeping significantly influences 
peace duration when the liberal peace provisions are either not implemented or do not achieve a 
high implementation rate. This effect can be seen in the second part of the figure (3b), which 
replicates the first part accounting for the deployment of the UN peacekeeping forces. 
In other words, the roles and influence of peacekeeping is different depending on the progress of 
the liberal peace implementation. This finding is understandable since a few key provisions of 
liberal peacebuilding (e.g. military reform, demilitarization, demobilization and reintegration of 
ex-combatants, repatriation of refugees and IPDs) are closely associated with the objectives of 
UN peacekeeping. In the cases where more liberal peace provisions are implemented, the urgent 
security issues with which peacekeeping is primarily concerned are more likely to be addressed. 
In contrast, when the above security-related provisions are not implemented and the risk of 
security destabilisation is high, the operation of external military troops makes a stronger 
contribution as a deterrence force. 
From a theoretical perspective, this finding offers more nuanced information on the roles of 
peacekeeping in maintaining peace in post-conflict societies than many previous studies that 
examined its overall impact (Doyle and Sambanis 2006; Fortna 2004; Greig and Diehl 2005; 
Joshi 2013; Joshi and Mason 2011; Walter 1997). Moreover, this finding has significant policy 
implications. The deployment of UN peacekeeping is costly given the time required to get 
consensus among permanent members in the Security Council and the financial resources and 
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logistics involving the deployment, and security of the peacekeeping troops on the ground 
(Bosco, 2013; UN Peacekeeping, n.d.). Moreover, a recent study based on the PAM dataset also 
suggests that the deployment of external peacekeeping troops may deter the implementation of 
peace accords (Joshi, Lee and Mac Ginty 2017). Hence, there is a need for carefully planning the 
forms and procedures of external peacekeeping involvement.  If we know in advance some 
probability of the extent to which the liberal peace provisions will be implemented once the CPA 
is signed, the deployment of UN peacekeeping forces may or may not be necessary to sustain the 
peace. 
Moreover, the positive contribution of UN peacekeeping can be further confirmed by examining 
the liberal peace implementation rate with UN peacekeeping. Considering 12 cases where UN 
peacekeeping troops were deployed, the average of lenient implementation rate of liberal peace-
related provisions is 74.58 per cent, while the average of the cases with no peacekeeping was 65 
per cent. This implies that UN peacekeeping positively contributes to the implementation of 
liberal peacebuilding, and when the liberal peace is not well implemented, to the maintenance 
of a minimal level of peace. 
Figure 3 About Here. 
Robustness and Endogeneity Tests 
One could argue that the way we have derived the liberal peace implementation rate does not 
distinguish between accords that contain more liberal peace provisions and those that have few 
such provisions. This is because some accords contain 3 provisions while others contain 23 
provisions. When implemented fully, provisions will have the same implementation rate. Models 
6-10 replicate models 1-5 with a rescaled liberal peace implementation rate variable in a way that 
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takes all liberal peace provisions into account when calculating the liberal peace implementation 
rate. For example, a CPA that has 3 liberal peace provisions will get a [(3*3)/(23*3)]*100 = 
13.04 per cent implementation rate for full implementation compared to 95.65 per cent 
implementation [(22*3)/(23*3)]*100 for an accord that has 22 out of 23 liberal peace provisions. 
This is a significant change in the way the independent variable was measured in Model 1-6. 
Results from this change are reported in Model 7-12 in Table 3. After this significant change in 
the main independent variable, however, the effect of liberal peace implementation on peace 
duration is still in the expected direction and highly significant (p<0.001). 
Table 4 presents two additional models (Model 13 and 14) that include two variables to capture a 
number of liberal peace provisions as well as a number of non-liberal peace provisions. This 
allows us to contextualize the liberal peacemaking approach as it unfolds in a real setting. When 
the rate of implementation is the same, can the number of liberal peace provisions negotiated in a 
CPA influence the durable peace? As can be seen, provisions themselves are not significant when 
examined alone with the implementation rate both in lenient and strict tests.5 This lends support 
to our argument that the liberal peace provisions or the scope of liberal reform as negotiated in 
the accord are not sufficient if they are not implemented.   
Moreover, because we derive a standardized score for implementation of liberal peace provisions 
in CPAs and do not make a distinction between the importance of individual provisions, one 
could suggest that some provisions are critically important in a time of transition from war to 
peace (e.g., powersharing, military reform etc.) than provisions that can be addressed once peace 
is more durable (e.g., children’s rights, indigenous people’s rights etc.). It is logical that some 
peace process actors choose to prioritize the implementation of certain provisions in earlier 
                                                 
5 We also performed bivariate tests both lenient and strict and the provision variable is not significant.  
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phases to build confidence and trust between former adversaries and then focus on other 
provisions in later phases. However, in most cases, provisions in peace agreements are not meant 
to be implemented independently. Many of these provisions are implemented concurrently and 
the processes are very much sequential and interrelated, which makes it difficult to isolate the 
implementation of some provisions from others in empirical analysis. As can be seen in pairwise 
correlation tests (Table 4), almost all provisions are statistically correlated with each other.  
Table 4 About Here. 
One could also argue that liberal peace implementation processes are endogenous to factors that 
potentially influence the armed conflict recurrence as well as liberal peace implementation. In 
their study, Hartzell and Hoddie (2007: 58) find that protracted conflict determines the 
powersharing provisions in peace accords. Work by DeRouen and Sobek (2004) finds state 
capacity to influence civil war duration and outcome. Similarly, DeRouen et al (2010) find state 
capacity to influence peace implementation. In our analysis, we include war duration, battle 
deaths and UN peacekeeping variables which explain civil war settlement itself. Similarly, the 
inclusion of the infant mortality rate, GDP growth rate, and the armed personnel variables 
enables us to view state capacity in terms of the state’s ability to deliver public goods (infant 
mortality rate) as well as the state’s coercive power and its projection.  
The implementation data generating process is also another potential source of endogeneity. This 
would be the case here if the implementation rate (independent variable) is influenced by the 
post-CPA peaceful environment (dependent variable). In our empirical analysis, we use the PAM 
implementation data, which is collected independent of whether the armed protagonists went 
back to conflict or not after they signed the CPA (see Joshi and Darby 2013; Joshi, Quinn, and 
Regan 2015). Out of 34 CPA cases, signatories went back to armed conflict in 10 cases. This 
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however does not mean that the implementation did not proceed in those cases. Regardless of 
violence, in all cases implementation proceeded except for Sierra Leone’s 1996 accord and 
Angola’s 1994 accord. The PAM project stopped collecting implementation data for Sudan’s 
2005 CPA in 2011 after the independence of South Sudan.  
It is also possible that implementation of liberal peace provisions and durable peace are both 
influenced by the willingness of actors to implement liberal peace provisions. As our data suggests, 
there is significant variation in liberal peace provisions as well as the implementation of those 
provisions across CPA cases. The willingness of policy makers to implement liberal peace 
provisions could be affected by the prospect for stable negative peace. Hence, it should be 
acknowledged that the causal relationship between the liberal peace implementation and the 
duration of negative peace cannot be substantiated further without information about the 
willingness of actors. Nevertheless, the statistical robustness of our findings proposes a strong 
correlation between the liberal peace nature and peace duration, which offers a solid empirical 
foundation for further studies. 
 
Concluding discussion 
The key finding of this article challenges the widely shared notion in normative discussions that 
the liberal peace has barely done any good. The article suggests that the duration of peace is 
improved if the liberal aspects of peace are included in peace accords and subsequently 
implemented. A one per cent increase in the liberal peace implementation rate leads to a nine per 
cent increase in the duration of peace between the signatories who signed the CPA. Although the 
articulation of the causal relations between them requires further studies, the clear correlation as 
well as other research findings suggest that the liberal aspects of peacemaking should be taken 
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seriously as they are a predictor of the longevity of peace. While the conventional critiques on the 
various limitations of the liberal peace are still valid, the evaluation of the roles of the liberal 
peacebuilding should be done in a more nuanced way, observing both the positive and negative 
dimensions of this approach to peacemaking. Especially during the chaotic periods in the aftermath 
of armed conflicts, the implementation of liberal elements may have a positive influence in 
deterring the remobilisation of military movements and stabilising security. To put it another way, 
this means that coercive and illiberal forms of peace are short-lived and therefore potentially 
counterproductive.  
This finding revisits the validity of previous academic debates on the liberal peace and calls for 
more nuanced approaches to the roles and functions of the liberal peace elements in post-conflict 
peacebuilding. To reiterate, the difference between the duration of peace and the quality of peace 
should be acknowledged. Many critiques of liberal peacebuilding concentrate on the latter rather 
than the former. By using the term ‘no war, no peace’, studies argue that a poor quality 'peace', 
marked bys continuing divisions, poverty, authoritarian rule, and lack of freedom, can persist 
without a resumption of large-scale violent conflict (Baghdasarian and Yunusov, 2005; Mac Ginty, 
2006; Kappler, 2013). Many post-peace accord states (e.g., Bosnia-Herzegovina) have experienced 
serious public dissatisfaction with the peace accord and post-accord living standards, yet they have 
not reverted back into civil war (Magill and Hamber, 2011). Nevertheless, this study suggests that 
the progress in the liberal peace may play positive roles, at least, in maintaining negative peace in 
the aftermath of civil war. 
We cannot construct an axiomatic causal link between liberal peace implementation and peace 
duration. Multiple factors may be at work to explain the duration of a ‘peace’ including the 
exhaustion of potential combatants and a range of exogenous factors such as regional dynamics or 
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the state of the global economy. Moreover, when the long durée of a peace is examined in a 
particular society (for example, Northern Ireland) then we can see that notions of linear time in 
homogenous units are problematic (Loftus, 2013). Our focus is admittedly short-termist in this 
sense, but it is worth noting that much of contemporary peacemaking occupies the short-term realm.  
In addition, this study examined two types of field deployment (peacekeeping forces and 
verification mechanisms) and how they interact with peace accords that may be compliant with the 
liberal peace. Our findings suggest that the deployment of UN peacekeeping alongside a liberal 
peace accord has a positive impact on the duration of peace. Somewhat counter-intuitively, the 
institution of peace accord verification mechanisms does not have a positive impact although there 
may be timing and sequencing issues at play in explaining this finding in that verification 
mechanisms may be most active at particular periods in a peace process/peace accord lifecycle.  
Moreover, while the evaluation of cases included in the analysis suggests overwhelming support 
for our argument, this study does not examine systemic peace within the country. Violence may 
occur in some parts of the country or be below a threshold required to be included in databases on 
conflict. While many security incident databases capture violent incidents, they are less well 
equipped to capture the tensions and exclusions that amount to structural or indirect violence. 
Moreover, the implementation of formal aspects of a peace accord is likely to be only one aspect 
of a post-accord peacebuilding process. Peace accords often concentrate on the public, legal and 
political realms of peacemaking, which may include constitutional reform, and various state-
building, governance and security sector reform tasks. Many other issues may legitimately be 
regarded as part of a peacebuilding process (e.g., land reform, infrastructure support, programmes 
focusing on people-to-people behavior) but these are seldom formally included in peace accords.  
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Having said this, our examination presents the need to scrutinize more thoroughly the content and 
implementation emphases of peace accords. The extent to which a peace accord is ‘liberal’ in the 
sense of covering key liberal peace tropes like human rights and the promotion of democracy, and 
the extent to which these aspects are implemented, have an impact on the duration of peace. The 
findings highlight the need to unpack and scrutinize more thoroughly the complex roles of liberal 
peacemaking. We should not see peace accords as undifferentiated and uniformly positive political 
phenomena. Hence, finer-grained research to understand the precise relationships between 
institutions and liberalism is required. For instance, do the liberal aspects of peace accords, such as 
human rights legislation, require the building of particular types of institutions? There is also a 
need to disaggregate the various tropes within the liberal peace. It is clear that the liberal peace is 
best treated in the plural rather than as some sort of monolithic leviathan.  
It is a task for future research, in this sense, to measure the different social and political impacts 
that the areas of the liberal peace reforms have on the development of post-conflict peacebuilding. 
This notion of disaggregating the contents of the liberal peace, and contextualizing it, also suggests 
the necessity for a conceptual endeavor to look afresh at the concept of the liberal peace. Among 
some areas of the literature, it has become a by-word for power politics cloaked in a liberal 
sounding verbiage. This may suggest that a future intellectual task can rescue liberalism (at least 
those positive aspects that qualitatively improve peace) from ‘the liberal peace’ that is often 
regarded as illiberal. 
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